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Budget priorities for health and the environment have traditionally been
negotiated and debated in a variety of political and policy terms. In recent years,
however, some decisionmakers have proposed a single, uniform policy language,
"risk based budgeting," to allocate fiscal resources according to quantitative
analyses of comparative risks to health and the environment. The ranking of
risks according to their relative severity-that is, putting the "worst first '"1-is
an attempt to translate traditional dialogues about budgetary legislation into the
language of science.
Risk based budgeting proposals have particularly addressed-and been
addressed by-the field of environmental research. In November, 1990, the
Science Advisory Board (SAB) of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published a study that compared the severities of various health and environ-
mental risks.2 Shortly after, President Bush announced a new commitment to
use risk based budgeting for health and safety regulation.3 Recent legislative
bills, including the proposed Ritter-Zimmer Amendment to the Environmental
Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1991 ,4 have
included specific provisions to initiate risk based budgeting for environmental
research. Such proposals can be expected to reappear in the upcoming 103d
Congress. Meanwhile, academic debates on the broader application of
comparative risk analysis have intensified.5
1. This phrase originates from several sources. E.g., Fiscal Year 1992 EPA Research and Development
Budget: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment, US. House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1991) [hereinafter EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing] (statement of Don Ritter) (proposing research
budgeting for "worst environmental risk first"); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information,
and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992); Peter H. Schuck,
The Worst Should Go First, Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541
(1992).
2. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-SAB-EC-90-021,
REDUCING RISK: SETING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 20 (1990)
[hereinafter REDUCING RISK]. See generally Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 SCIENCE 616
(1990) (reporting EPA proposals for reforming priorities on basis of comparative risk).
3. 137 CONG. REC. H842 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1991) (1992 budget message of President Bush) (making
committment "to employ risk management budgeting in addressing threats to health and safety").
4. Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1991, H.R. 2404,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 1; Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board's Report
on "Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Interest, 22 ENVTL L 149 (1992);
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Any effective prioritization ranks competing objectives by comparing their
values to the decisionmaker and her constituency. Prioritization should be, almost
by definition, systematic (to ensure that methods of evaluation are sufficiently
similar to justify comparison) and comprehensive (to ensure that all objectives
are compared). Accordingly, priorities should be explicitly and consciously set
according to germane criteria. By this definition, prioritization is valuable as
a form of reasoned planning.
Although scientific methods such as comparative risk analysis can contribute
a reasoned and valuable focus to priority setting debates, the contributions that
specialists make to the process of prioritization need not-and cannot-justify
the allocation of resources according to some scientifically and infallibly
persuasive set of facts. Any prioritization should-and will-embody funda-
mental values in comparing the relative values and requirements of relevant
objectives.6 Indeed, as will be argued, the more values and criteria that are
incorporated in the comparison, the more comprehensive the planning system
and the better reasoned its selected criteria are likely to be.
This Note examines institutional and policy implications of risk based
budgeting with a specific focus on EPA research. Part I outlines problems in
the current priority setting budgetary processes of EPA's Office of Research
and Development (ORD). Part II introduces current proposals for risk based
budgeting and their advantages. Part III discusses two potential problems with
these proposals: relative dominance of the process by the Executive; and the
foreclosure of various other policies, including the accommodation of scientific
uncertainty, the equalization of risk distribution, the comparison of alternative
risk reduction methods and allocations of responsibility and resources, and the
minimization of costs involved in changing agendas. To mitigate some of the
problems introduced in Part Ill, Part IV recommends that Executive priority
setting be largely moved out of the Office of Management and Budget and
delegated to EPA, ORD, and the SAB. In addition, there should be a parallel
delegation in Congress, with power shifting away from the appropriations
committees to the environmental science subcommittees and Congress' Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA). These delegations should enable risk based
budgeting reform legislation to address other significant scientific, political, and
bureaucratic policy considerations.7
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 562,610-16 (1992); IntegratedPollution Control. A Symposium, 22 ENVrL. L. 1 (1992).
See generally Symposium, Risk Assessment in Environmental Law, 14 COLum. J. ENvTt. L. 289 (1989).
Resources for The Future, a Washington D.C. organization, plans a conference on comparative risk analysis
in November 1992.
6. This Note is less concerned with ORD's environmental research priorities themselves than with how
and by whom priorities should be set and the role of science in determining them. See generally SHEILA
JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990) (evaluating role of science
advisers in determining policy).
7. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCING AMERICAN LAW 65-70 (1983) (arguing need for lawyers
to learn to speak the language of statistical science critically).
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I. CURRENT PRIORITY SETTING PROBLEMS IN EPA's RESEARCH BUIDGET
EPA research priority setting currently articulates no systematic or compre-
hensive, let alone scientific, quantitative policy.8 Instead, research priorities are
determined substantially by fragmented statutes and piecemeal line items.
Research legislation often has an applied, regulatory orientation and is subject
to the potential abuse of political discretion.
A. Priority Setting Within the Budget Process
Although Congress and the Executive could prioritize rigorously during their
centralized budgetary decisionmaking, the proportions of the environmental
research budget are not set in an independent priority setting process, but rather
are set almost de facto, in the course of the complex budget process of those
branches. Budgeting power is shared by the Executive and Congress, where it
is concentrated in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the
Appropriations Committees respectively. Judicial review of budgetary priorities
is generally absent, whether this judicial deference is justified by indirect
formulaic doctrines9 or by explicit policy considerations.10 Except in blatant
cases of abuse, judicial deference leaves discretion over budget priorities to the
other two branches of government.
In the Executive, environmental research priorities for EPA's ORD are
initially formed during the long budgetary process in which ORD proposals,
8. Telephone Interviews with Samuel Rondberg, Designated Federal Official, Human Health Subcommit-
tee, Science Advisory Board (Mar. 12 & Apr. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Rondberg Interview] (describing chain
of practical priority setting by scientists, administrators, and congressmen with ever shallower experience
and broader authority). EPA's ORD budget is divided in two ways by twelve diverse media areas (air, water,
hazardous waste, etc.) and a motley set of twelve discipline areas or "program elements" (assessment,
engineering, Great Lakes, etc.).
9. A series of D.C. Circuit opinions on agricultural research priorities exemplifies judicial deference
to the other two branches on a variety of doctrinal grounds, although analysis reveals that interpretive and
factual assumptions determine decisions far more than does the choice of doctrinal approach. See, e.g.,
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85-86 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J.) (holding chal-
lenged agricultural germplasm research program was insufficiently specific to constitute "major" or "final
federal action"); id. at 89-90 (Buckley, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (reaching similar
conclusion on the merits); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block, No. 84-3045, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at * 12 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1986) (finding no "meaningful standards" to review priorities in agricultural research
statute, leaving them in Department's "absolute discretion"), aff'dsub nom. Foundation on Economic Trends
v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that research projects were too "diverse. . . discrete
and independent" to constitute the "major Federal action" requiring environmental impact statement).
10. In deferring to executive priority setting in the context of agency enforcement, the Supreme Court
has offered constitutional and institutional policy rationales. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
838 (1985) (establishing presumption that a failure to enforce is "committed to agency discretion" and hence
nonreviewable, with presumption rebuttable by contrary statutory indication or colorable constitutional rights
violation).
In the area of environmental budgeting, the D.C. Circuit explicitly accorded interbranch comity in
National Wildlife Federation v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (withholding
mandamus and declaratory relief for President's failure to justify budgetary requests falling short of levels
in the administration's own, congressionally-approved Statement of Policy, "in order to show the utmost
respect to the office of the Presidency").
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modified by EPA superiors, are forwarded to the executive Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. Under the authority of certain Executive Orders, OMB
exercises potentially valuable oversight and discretion through which the
President attempts to control a multitude of political, economic, and bureaucratic
policies."1 In Congress, the House and Senate subcommittees on the environ-
ment consider the President's budget priorities for EPA research," but, although
these congressional subcommittees focus, evaluate, and publicize priorities, they
reportedly have little power over the final research and development budget
because they do not hold the actual purse strings. The appropriations
committees-informed by their subcommittees on Veterans Administration,
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies-dominate the
congressional budgetary process.13 Appropriations legislation is subject only
to emergency deficit control legislation.1
4
B. Current Problems
1. Fragmentary Legislation and Line Items
The fragmentary, piecemeal structure of ORD's budgetary legislation
impedes systematic, comprehensive priority setting. ORD is not funded by
11. E.g., Exec. OrderNo. 12,498,3 C.F.R. at 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (strengthen-
ing centralized regulatory review by OMB and executive heads); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. at 127
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (establishing OMB management of regulatory impact analysis,
executive policy roles, and cost-benefit analysis; authorizing Council on Competitiveness to oversee executive
policy and management, including consideration of economic effects of regulation by OMB and EPA). See
generally JERRY L MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 241-57
(3d ed. 1992) (discussing OMB role and reviewing assessments of its constitutional authority and
performance); Jeffrey H. Howard and Linda E. Benfield, Rulemaking in the Shadows: The Rise of OMB
and Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143 (1991).
12. Administrators or assistant administrators of ORD and chairs of the Science Advisory Board Research
and Development Subcommittee are among the witnesses who report before Congress in the spring. The
hearings for budget authorization begin before the House, specifically, the Subcommittee on Environment
(formerly, Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment), after which an authorization bill
is drafted and "marked up." The bill then proceeds to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
13. Rondberg Interview, supra note 8.
14. E.g., The Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (The "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" Act) and its
progeny. 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-09 (West Supp. 1992). Accordingly, final reconciliatory negotiations and the threat
of sequestration remain to haunt the funds. OMB must then actually apportion the funds, and last minute
alterations do occasionally occur. The Administrator retains discretion to shift or "reprogram" a small
percentage of the budget, but must inform Congress of shifts above this percentage. Telephone Interviews
with Jay Messer, Science Advisor to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (Mar. 12 & Apr. 8, 1991) [hereinafter
Messer Interviews]; Rondberg Interview, supra note 8. Funds are finally "obligated" and "outlayed" to
researchers in the academy, industry, and public interest groups who apply for grants; contracts for extramural
research form approximately 50% of the ORD's budget. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-SAB-EC-90-012, REVIEW OF THE FISCAL 1991 PRESIDENT'S BUDGEr FOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 3-4 and figure 1 (1990), reprinted in EPA R&D Fiscal Year 1991 Budget
Request: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment
of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, US. House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
45-56 (1990) [hereinafter EPA R&D FY 91 Hearing] (illustrating ratio between intramural salaries and
expenses, and extramural research and development programs).
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independent legislation, but by specialized sections of separate environmental
acts. 5 Moreover, agency officials have reportedly been dismayed by the
dramatic increase in individual line items during recent years, 16 which tend
to accumulate additively in the budget, preventing the simultaneous comparison
of all competing programs.
2. Regulatory Bias and the Problem of Basic Research
Because it faces directives that are essentially concerned with controlling
pollution, ORD typically must orient its research toward immediate regulatory
interests.17 Yet regulatory requirements particularly compromise the need for
"basic" (also called "core" or "fundamental") research. Increasing the ratio of
basic research to applied research is an important goal of many scientists and
science bureaucrats in the budgetary review process.'8 Presently, however,
applied research is heavily emphasized because regulators are authorized to
engage ORD scientists in research support for regulatory programs.19 While
regulators often favor "applied" (regulatory or strategic) research because it
addresses specific, immediate regulatory problems, the more theoretical scientific
interests that basic research pursues may offer important long-term benefits or
warnings.
15. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6981(1988); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9660 (1988); Toxic
Substances Control Act (TOSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2609 (1988); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136r (1988).
16. Rondberg Interview, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with Tom Veirce, Program Analyst, ORD
(May 14, 1991) [hereinafter Veirce Interview].
17. For example, one of four purposes of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 was "to initiate and
accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution."
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (1988). The Act directs the EPA Administrator to achieve this by conducting and
coordinating research into the "causes, effects (including health and welfare effects), extent, prevention, and
control of air pollution." 42 U.S.C.A. § 7403(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984-1990). This active role is significantly
modified, however, by the section's detailed requirements for cooperation with other public and private
agencies. The Administrator must not only assist public and private agencies technically and financially,
but must actually perform research "concerning any specific problem ... in cooperation with any air pollution
control agency... to recommend... a solution ... if he is requested to do so by such agency." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7403(a)(3) (1988). This language lends statutory weight to the administrative weight with which regulators
tend to lean on research staff for short term projects and definite outcomes.
18. Cuts in the past decade, see infra note 72, not only reduced the ratio of ORD's budget within EPA,
but reduced the funds available after imperative regulatory research needs have been met. The importance
and problems of basic research are further elaborated in JASANOFF, supra note 6, at 76-80, 237.
19. For example, the mandates for promoting training and dissemination of more basic environmental
research, see supra note 17, are qualified by requirements to provide such training to 'personnel of air
pollution control agencies ... without charge." 42 U.S.C. § 7403(a)(5), (b)(5) (1988). Such mandates to
support applied research may dilute the discretion of the EPA Administrator should she wish to set a different
balance in ORD. Thus ORD recently took credit for working "closely with the EPA Office of Air and
Radiation on setting priorities for research and technical support," but noted that "[tihe pressing nature of
many of the specific requirements of the new air law necessitates substantial near-term support at the expense
of longer term research." EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1, at 13-14 (statement of Erich Bretthauer,
Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Research and Development).
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3. Loss of Critical Mass
Without adequate planning, certain programs may fall below so-called critical
mass. Without funds sufficient to produce results of any significance, such
programs impose waste; they might as well not have been funded at all. For
example, the 1991 request for pollution prevention, a program that aims to reduce
disposal, cleaning, and recycling, arguably failed to reach critical mass.
Ironically, the $11.3 million request was less than the cost of cleaning just one
of the many failed recycling plants on the Superfund list! As one science
administrator remarked, although pollution prevention is "routinely" described
as "top priority,... [y]ou can't get much research for $11 million."2 General-
ly, the failure to plan and provide for adequate funding is exacerbated by across-
the-board cuts in the closing stages of the budgetary process. When all programs
are indiscriminately cut by a fixed proportion, high priority areas will get less
funds, but the lowest priorities may get too little.
4. Special Interests
Allegations of improperly motivated "special interests" plague the priority
setting process. Interviews with government officials indicate the undocumented
but pervasive influence of partisan and professional concerns and opportunism
during both executive priority setting and congressional hearings, particularly
where line items are concerned. OMB has also been accused of unwarranted
interference with other Executive representations21 and responsibilities22 to
Congress. Illustrating the mutual suspicions and preemptive strategies inherent
20. EPA R&D FY 91 Hearing, supra note 14, at 67 (statement of Joel Hirschhorn, Senior Associate
and Project Director, Office of Technology Assessment).
21. Since 1985, EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB) has critically reviewed the EPA research and
development portion of the President's budget, with periodic expressions of frustration, including criticism
of uncooperative action by OMB. See, e.g., John Neuhold, Cover Letter to ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, RESEARCH STRATEGIES ADVISORY COMMrrrEE, EPA-SAB-RSAC-92-017, AN SAB REPORT: REVIEW
OF FY 1993 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST FOR R&D (1992) (criticizing OMB for "last-minute delivery"
of budgetary data for review and advocating use of errata sheets and improved and consistent categorization).
SAB members were previously frustrated when their reviews of budget priorities were confined to five year
plans. Letter from Raymond Loehr, Chairman, SAB and John Neuhold, Chairman, R&D Budget Review
Subcommittee, to James H. Scheuer, Chairman, Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research,
and Environment, reprinted in EPA R&D FY 91 Hearing, supra note 14, at 35. See generally SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD, EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD: TAKING STOCK/REACHING OUT, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989 (1990).
22. For example, impropriety has been suggested in OMB's commissioning of its own scientific investiga-
tions at a crucial stage in the Montreal negotiations on regulating ozone-depleting substances, allegedly
attempting to undermine the strong interagency consensus and international negotiating position which the
State Department and U.S. Ambassador had achieved under their congressional mandate. RICHARD E.
BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECrIONs IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 59-62 (1991). President
Reagan ultimately sided with Secretary of State Schultz and the Ambassador against the OMB position.
Id. at 65-67. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7456 (1988) (repealed 1990) (directing President through Secretary of State
and Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International and Scientific Affairs to negotiate international
treaties etc. for ozone research and protection).
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in testimony before Congress, one official confidentially quoted a previous EPA
administrator as wryly advising that environmental risks should be measured
as "risks to the Administrator!"
Of course, the characterization of particular portions of the budget as either
narrowly biased or appropriately directed is itself highly controversial, especially
when allegations fail to specify the legal or ethical norms allegedly violated,
or the assumptions and biases of the critic. Decisionmakers may well describe
their own projects as paying legitimate attention to particular problems, while
casting aspersions on the motivations behind their opponents' projects.2 It
remains difficult to imagine how any legislative project would not be open to
such charges.24 Nevertheless, the absence of common criteria for debating the
merits of disparate programs and setting priorities certainly exacerbates rumors
and possibly the opportunities for abuse, however defined.
II. RISK BASED BUDGETING PROPOSALS
Risk based budgeting is the leading, if somewhat limited, methodological
candidate for reforming priorities in the fragmented, regulatory environmental
budget.
A. Executive and Legislative Proposals
The SAB's comparative study, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and
Strategies for Environmental Protection,' summarized the findings of three
SAB subcommittee studies.26 Comparing ecological risks, the study analyzed
23. For example, at recent hearings of the House Subcommittee on Veterans Administration, Housing
and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies, Congressman Bill Green (R-N.Y.) questioned the
omission from the agency's new budget request of a line item added by the Appropriations Committee the
previous year. Don Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, responded for the EPA that
the quarter million dollars for air research and planning had unfairly favored Northeastern states. Departments
of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations for
1990: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. 64 (1989). See also, e.g., Colin Norman, Science Budget: Growth Amid Red Ink, 251 SCIENCE
616, 616-18 (outlining executive criticism of $810 million in congressionally earmarked line items, but
describing other special programs and cuts favored by the Executive).
24. See generally Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 32-33, 41-43 (1982) (summarizing strategic tendencies of legislative process; modelling incentives for
President and other elected officials to provide private benefits).
Besides the controversial aspects of characterization, researchers face difficulties because portions of
the budget are often aggregated or ambiguously reallocated, Telephone Interview with Oscar Morales, Program
Analyst, Office of Research and Development (Apr. 10, 1991), and because ORD officials, otherwise helpful,
may be reluctant to release budgetary documents, Veirce, ORD, supra note 14.
25. REDUCING RISK, supra note 2.
26. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-SAB-EC-90-021A,
APPENDIX A: THE REPORT OFTHE ECOLOGY AND WELFARE SUBCOMMIrEE (1990); EPA-SAB-EC-90-021B,
APPENDIX B: THE REPORT OF THE HUMAN HEALTH SUBCOMMITTEE (1990); and EPA-SAB-EC-90-021C,
APPENDIX C: THE REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK,
APPENDIX A, B, or C]. REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, was the work of the SAB's Relative Risk Reduction
Strategies Committee.
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potential harms to humans and other species as well as their relative permanence
and geographical scope.27 To compare health risks, the study analyzed factors
such as the number of people at risk and the probability and severity of health
effects.28 The Strategic Options Subcommittee detailed the risk based budgeting
proposal in an appendix to the Report.29 Criticizing EPA's current orientation
and statutory structure as generally remedial and unintegrated," SAB urged
EPA to plan and budget on the basis of comparative risk research.3'
Six months (and twenty thousand copies) after the publication of Reducing
Risk,32 the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology adopted the
first legislative bill requiring EPA's research budget proposals to take account
of scientific comparisons of risks. "Risk-based budgeting" formed a section of
the proposed Ritter-Zimmer amendment to the Environmental Research, Devel-
opment, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1991.33 This legislation would
have required the Administrator of EPA to identify, assess, define, prioritize,
coordinate, plan, budget, and report to Congress on priorities---"at least [ten]
research issues, correlating to environmental hazards in the category of highest
risk to human health and the environment"--including priorities in preventative
"source reduction. ''" In the Senate, a broader bill for an Environmental Risk
Reduction Act proposed not only comparative risk research, but also direct
guidance for regulatory decisionmaking Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
sponsored the legislation to establish SAB committees on relative environmental
risks and benefits; to establish an interagency panel on risk assessment and
27. The Ecology and Welfare Subcommittee of SAB's Relative Risk Reduction Strategies Committee
summarized "Relatively High Risks" as habitat alteration and destruction (including wetland degradation,
erosion, and deforestation); species extinction and the overall loss of biological diversity; stratospheric ozone
depletion; and global climate change. "Relatively Medium Risks" were herbicides and pesticides; toxics,
nutrients, biochemical oxygen demand and turbidity in surface waters; acid deposition; and airborne toxics.
"Relatively Low Risks" included oil spills; groundwater pollution; radionuclides; acid runoff to surface waters;
and thermal pollution. REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 13.
28. The Human Health Subcommittee of SAB's Relative Risk Reduction Strategies Committee
summarized "Risks to Human Health" as ambient air pollutants; worker exposure to chemicals in industry
and agriculture; indoor pollution; drinking water pollutants. These were classified as "relatively high-risk
rankings... supported more firmly by the available data than ... other health problems." REDUCING RISK,
supra note 2, at 14. This subcommittee report thus actually presented a ranking of scientific reliability, not
a ranking of risks. For example, "pesticide residues on food and toxic chemicals in consumer products"
received only a cursory mention. Id.
29. REDUCING RISK APPENDIX C, supra note 26, at 7-8, 59-60.
30. REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 3.
31. REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 6 (recommendations 1, 3,4, and 5). Other recommendations urged
EPA to make ecological considerations equal to health (recommendation 2) and economics (recommendation
10) in general public policy-making (recommendation 8), and to supplement regulation with market incentives
(recommendation 6), pollution prevention (recommendation 7), and public education (recommendation 9).
32. Telephone Conversation with Joanna Foellmer, Staffnember, SAB (Apr. 3, 1991) (describing sales).
33. Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1991, H.R. 2404,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1991).
34. Id.
35. S. 2132, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); cf. H.R. 5435, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (proposing
Comprehensive Environmental Risk Management Act).
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reduction; and to set EPA priorities according to the likelihood, seriousness,
magnitude, and irreversibility of health, welfare, and ecological risks.
36
While ORD is seen as an appropriate bureau to begin testing the legislative
policy of unifying the debate on risk,37 congressional observers regard the
broader application of risk based budgeting between regulatory programs as
unrealistic at present.38 Nevertheless, in a general climate conducive to large
scale, if not systematic, prioritization39 and science based legislation,4 future
risk based budgeting reform bills can be expected.
B. The Promise of Risk Based Budgeting
Risk based budgeting attempts to provide a scientific method for setting
environmental priorities, including research priorities, by enriching the relevant
debates with both a comprehensive system and well-articulated, specific criteria.
Risk is "systematic" when it serves as a common criterion for comparing
competing environmental objectives, and it is "comprehensive" when it is broadly
applicable to any such objectives. Risk can be explicitly, even quantitatively,
estimated and is surely a germane criterion for evaluating environmental
problems.
Quantitative risk analysis is complex because it involves specialized
.experimentation, computation, and estimation. Risk based priority setting would
be delegated to government scientists and specialized administrators who would
be well-situated to quantify various aspects of risk and to evaluate competing
36. S. 2132, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1991).
37. See EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Don Ritter) (describing ORD as
"cornerstone" of effort to address "worst environmental risk first").
38. Messer Interviews, supra note 14; cf. The Role of Science at EPA and Budget Authorization for
EPA's Office of Research and Development: Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (testimony of Adam M. Finkel, Risk Management Fellow, Resources for
the Future) (presenting opposing concerns about the sufficiency of environmental science, public acceptability,
and systemic factors of lifestyle and innovation); William K. Stevens, WhatReally Threatens the Environment?
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at C4 (late ed.) (reporting doubts about initiatives).
39. Traditional inertia in the budget may be lessening during the current congressional dissension over
priorities. Budgetary debates have become more fierce as old concerns for annual incremental adjustments
have given way to debates over budgetary bases and priorities. AARON B. WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLmcs
OF THE BUDOETARY PRocEss 29, 199-203 (1988). Traditional incremental budgeting takes account of the
previous fiscal period as a "base." Two alternatives budget more comprehensively: (1) "zero-based budgeting,"
which is a total reconsideration of expenditures for discrete programs without reference to their previous
bases; and (2) "planning, programming, and budgeting" across policy areas. Id. at 416-20.
40. Messer Interviews, supra note 14. See, e.g., Acid Precipitation Act of 1980,42 U.S.C.A. § 8903-06
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (requiring National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP)); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a-y (1988); Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976 (TOSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988) (mandating comparison of costs and benefits
to measure acceptability of certain risks); U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), see infra notes
119-128 and accompanying text; the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program (EMAP), see 55
Fed. Reg. 12,725, 12,726 (1990). Another parallel is the assumption of a common metric in the provisions
for trading air pollution licenses in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671(f) (West
Supp. 1984-1990. E. Donald Elliott, General Counsel, EPA, and Professor, Yale Law School, Master's Talk
at Saybrook College, Yale University (Apr. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Elliott Talk].
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research initiatives and directions.41 Risk based budgeting can therefore be
regarded, even by those skeptical of technocracy, as scientific in its practical
operation, methodological sweep, and precision, but, of course, not as an ideal,
infallible truth.
Some argue that quantitative prioritization is particularly necessary because
resources are limited.4' While resources are always limited, extreme scarcity
certainly exacerbates allocation problems; the $279 million that EPA spent for
research and development in 199243 buys less than the $206 million it spent
in 1981,'4 while ORD's research demands have doubled. 45 However, the
argument is somewhat weakened by the corollary that when resources are
especially scarce, the cost of quantitative prioritization may itself need to be
limited.46
I1. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT RISK BASED BUDGETING PROPOSALS
Despite the promise of risk based budgeting, decisionmakers should not
allow it to dominate the budget process, thereby increasing Executive influence
and displacing other important considerations of environmental research policy.
A. Increasing Executive Influence
Current proposals would delegate risk based budgeting decisions primarily
to specialists within the executive branch, and thus would increase the relative
41. Advocates favor delegation due to the econonic efficiency of discretion exercised by experts. Jerry
L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
81, 91-93 (1985) [hereinafter Mashaw, Prodelegation] (favoring delegation when specialists' administrative
savings in decisionmaking and implementation exceed the cost of agency noncompliance and errors, a likely
scenario when noncompliance and errors can be institutionally deterred).
42. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 1, at 318-27 (presenting arguments for risk based priority setting
based on scarcity, accountability, and efficiencies in regulating and gathering information).
43. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1993-APPENDIX ONE 867 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. BUDGET
FY 93] (outlays excluding salaries and expenses).
44. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1983-APPENDIX I-S2 (1982) (excluding salaries and expenses).
45. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-SAB-91-005, REPORT
OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET REVIEW COMMITFEE: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1992
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT i, 3 (1991) [hereinafter SAB FY 92 REVIEW],
reprinted in EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1, at 80, 85 (describing decline in purchasing power of
ORD's budget and warning that ORD "will continue to be incapable of providing an adequate response to
environmental issues without a significant infusion of resources"). Since 1988, SAB has recommended a
doubling of the ORD budget within five years. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SAB-EC-88-040, FUTURE RISK: RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990's 5,18 (1988).
In general, the volume of research stemming from academic institutions as well as their demand for funds
has doubled in the past two decades. Leon M. Lederman, Science: The End of the Frontier?, 251 SCIENCE
supp. 8-10 (Jan. 1991) (documenting pessimism over funding of academic R&D in spite of 20% growth
in funding over 20 years, due to increased costs and complexity of research, regulation, and overhead, and
the doubling of university scientists during this period).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86 (discussing potential bureaucratic problems of systematic
prioritization).
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influence of the Executive over the priority setting process. As proposed,
comparative risk analyses would be performed within EPA itself and are unlikely
to be reviewed in equal depth by courts or even Congress.47
To some, of course, an increase in Executive authority in these matters might
seem desirable. Those who share the policy orientation of the current presidency
might wish to see its power augmented. Moreover, regardless of the personal
or partisan composition of the Executive institutions concerned, it seems most
efficient to delegate a task once, rather than twice; since Executive institutions
have traditionally supported science policy functions, their experience and
cultivated expertise make them the logical agents for delegation.
However, there are reasons to be cautious about concentrating such new
authority in the Executive branch. Questions of institutional design should
transcend partisan and presidential policy orientations. Moreover, bureaucratic
efficiency, however important, should not be the sole criterion for evaluating
the institutional and policy implications of risk based budgeting. The placement
of risk based budgeting in the Executive alone would be a delegation of unprece-
dented scope, with significant effects on the presentation of budgetary proposals
to Congress and, ultimately, the public.
Risk based budgeting legislation is more ambitious in scope than narrower
proposals for making quantitative comparisons among qualitatively similar goals
or risks.48 Within a group of similar risks or an individual research discipline
(pesticides or pesticide research, for instance), consensus is relatively easy to
achieve. Across disciplinary boundaries, however, even methodological matters
become extremely controversial.49 Risk based budgeting would compare risks
47. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing proposed bills).
48. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-SET-490, FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH:
DECISIONS FOR A DECADE 17-18 & n.29 (1991) (distinguishing priorities 'across' and 'within' research fields);
Applegate, supra note 1 at 350 (acknowledging that "[w]ithin a single program, choices are relatively easy"
because costs, benefits, and risks of chemicals are similar).
On intradisciplinary prioritization, see, for example, Bruce N. Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and
Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE 1256, 1261 (1983) (recommending prioritization of dietary risks); Applegate,
supra note I (proposing comparative risk analysis to restructure EPA regulation of toxic substances); John
N. Bahcall, Prioritizing Scientific Initiatives, 251 SCIENCE 1412, 1412-13 (1991) (describing research prioritiza-
tion in astronomy and astrophysics), citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DECADE OF DISCOVERY
IN ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS (1991); Bruce A Bolt, Balance of Risks and Benefits in Preparation
for Earthquakes, 251 SCIENCE 169, 172-73 (1991) (explaining prioritization of earthquake engineering studies
and reconstruction); Leslie Roberts, Ranking the Rainforests, 251 SCIENCE 1559 (1991) (describing prioritiza-
tion program for forest conservation); Schuck, supra note I (proposing prioritization of trials according to
severity of asbestos-related conditions).
On similarly intradisciplinary comparative studies or "meta-analyses," which strive to synthesize the
results of earlier applied or basic studies, compare Charles Mann, Meta-Analysis in the Breech, 249 SCIENCE
476 (1990) (describing meta-analysis); Henry S. Sacks et al.,Meta-analyses ofRandomized Controlled Trials,
316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450 (1987) (statistically analyzing and evaluating meta-analyses themselves).
49. See, e.g., H.R. 4192, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (unsuccessfully proposing coordination across
agencies of basic methodology for risk-assessments). For the controversy, compare H.R. 4192, The Risk
Assessment Research and Demonstration Act of1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources,
Agriculture Research and Environment of the Comm. on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-23 (1984) (statement of Nicholas Ashford, director, Center for Policy Alterna-
tives, MIT) (criticizing centralized risk assessment as uncertain, unnecessary, and potentially influential over
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as diverse as ozone depletion and hazardous waste sites, with an attendant range
of scientific, political, and bureaucratic conflicts, discussed in the following
section.
Although executive agency scientists would not make final policy decisions,
their work could form the basis for a new style of budgetary presentation by
OMB to Congress. Since "scientific" comparisons of risk can provide a
persuasive political rhetoric, Congress should be wary of legislation that
empowers scientists in the area of budgetary prioritization and would thus lend
to OMB policy presentations an aura of legitimacy not shared by Congressional
proposals. In the absence of sufficient reason to shift the current balance of
budgetary power (and, as will be argued, because risk analysis alone provides
insufficient reason), Congress should at least preserve the existing balance of
power over budgetary priorities.50
The problem of increasing executive influence over Congress through impres-
sive scientific presentations extends to the formation of public opinion. Budgetary
reform ultimately depends on political reform.51 The U.S. public already
considers environmental issues a top priority,52 but through polling, funding,
and public service reports and announcements, the government plays an important
role in shaping and taking account of the details of public opinion.53 As people
develop increasing concern about the environment and begin to make informed
comparisons of risk, the federal government's responsibility as educator
burgeons. Risk based budgeting has the potential for adding the legitimacy of
Congress and public) with id. at 66-68 (statement of Peter W. Huber, engineer and law clerk, U.S. Supreme
Court) (defending centralized risk assessment for systematic rationality and potential to "weaken, not
strengthen, OMB's influence" and OMB's ability to "divide and conquer").
50. While the Constitution gives the President duties to inform and make recommendations, U.S. CONST.
art. 11, § 3, which surely includes priority setting recommendations, the Constitution explicitly grants Congress
the powers to tax and spend, id., art. I, § 8, cl.l.
51. WILDAVSKY, supra note 39, at 411.
52. Among national concerns, environmental concerns have intensified the most, holding major
significance for 56% of those surveyed in 1987, and 78% in 1990. Luther P. Gerlach, Global Thinking, Local
Acting, 15 EVALUATION REV. 120, 131 (1991) (referring to Roper Reports).
53. Detailed rankings of public opinion show that public assessments of individual environmental risks
differ sharply from the rankings in the Executive's Reducing Risk study. See REDUCING RISK, APPENDIX
C, supra note 26, at 129 (summarizing Roper Reports). Donald Hornstein opposes the argument that the
public is vulnerable to cognitive errors and distortions of the relative magnitude of risks, based on variations
of information availability, different evaluation of risks depending on whether they are characterized as losses
or gains, and other prejudices (e.g., the "sexy crisis of the month," Messer Interviews, supra note 14).
Hornstein gives several responses. First, scientists themselves are constrained by uncertainties, erroneous
methods, and industry bias. Second, subordination of public interests to government risk analysis is likely
to be viewed as illegitimately undemocratic, whatever the cognitive errors. Finally, Hornstein advances a
rational basis for public evaluations-and alleged exaggerations-of risk: people perceive the speculative
quality of technical assessment and fear particular aspects of catastrophes, such as extraordinary scales, unequal
distributions, and uncontrollable agonies. Horstein, supra note 5, at 610-16.
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science to executive politics.54 On balance the arguments in favor of a dual
delegation are more persuasive.
B. Displaced Policy Issues
While risk based budgeting represents a significant attempt to translate
scientific language into budgetary language, the translation is an act of policy
55
that allows a range of value choices and approaches: from circumspect restraint,
to active prediction and exploration,56 to distortion.
Focus on comparative risks may obscure a variety of other factors, such
as scientific uncertainty, equality of risk distribution, costs of alternative risk
reduction methods, allocation of responsibility and resources, and bureaucratic
problems associated with changing agendas. Such factors should be incorporated
in risk analyses used for budgetary purposes.
1. Scientific Uncertainty
"Scientific" priority setting is necessarily limited by scientific uncertainty.
Research priority setting is particularly limited because research itself aims to
reduce this very uncertainty. Planning the direction of research therefore remains
a matter of policy that cannot be determined solely on the basis of quantitative
analysis.
In environmental and epidemiological research, causation questions involve
uncertainties that necessitate methodological assumptions and value judgments
in statistical tasks.57 Data may be excessive or lacking. (Latent diseases, for
54. Cf. WILLIAm K. REILLY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 20Z-1011, AIMING BEFORE
WE SHOOT: THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1990) (prefacing announcement of SAB's
Reducing Risk report by advertising executive environmental initiatives, mentioning president's name 23
times) (transcribing speech of Sept. 26, 1990 to National Press Club).
55. Even the internal methodologies of science are conditioned by social, commercial, and political
functions and funding, see JASANOFF, supra note 6, at 12-14, and science can be expected to meet political
resistance insofar as it threatens existing balances of power, see JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF
TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 137 (1988) (relating degree of industry opposition to strictness of regulatory
standards), or lifestyle, see, e.g., Bruce N. Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE
1256, 1258-59 (1983) (citing epidemiological studies indicating that exposure to "natural" risks in lifestyle
and diet, such as plant toxins and carcinogens, exceed those from man made toxic pesticides). Cf., e.g., supra
note 22 (noting OMB use of research to allegedly jeopardize ozone negotiations).
56. In REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 13-14, for example, the circumspect Human Health Subcommittee
shied away from the ordered approach of the Ecology and Welfare Subcommittee, and ranked health risks
by degrees of evidentiary substantiation, not by severity of risk. See supra notes 27-28; Leslie Roberts,
Ranking the Risks Proves Contentious, 249 SCIENCE 617 (1990) (describing different approaches of
subcommittee chairmen). Cf. generally, JOSEPH S. FRUTON, CONTRASTS IN SCIENTIFIC STYLE: RESEARCH
GROUPS IN THE CHEMICAL AND BIOCHEMICAL SCIENCES (1990).
57. See generally Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation? in
58 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 7-12 (1965) (outlining considerations supporting causal inferences); Frederick
Mosteller, Assessing UnknownNumbers: Order of Magnitude Estimation, in STATISTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
(William B. Fairley and Frederick Mosteller eds., 1977); Richard Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer:
The Need For a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (1980).
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example, involve possibly confounding or intervening factors; pollution involves
substance movement, degradation, and reactivity.) Extrapolation entails method-
ological problems such as dose-response uncertainties and interspecies
comparison; generalization is complicated by variabilities in human sensitivity.58
Scientific paradigms can shift.59 Risk assessment methodologies are also
affected by the standards of risk management: the lower the standards of accept-
able risk, the greater the tolerated margins for methodological error.
In addition, the probability of harm cannot be equated with the probability
of achieving significant results in research. The significance of research is "often
a serendipitous affair,"60 unknown in advance. Historically, many of the greatest
risks have arisen because of what was not known.61 One of the very purposes
of environmental research is to determine which risks prevail and their respective
magnitudes. Even when the probabilities of certain events are estimably small,
their potential magnitude may justify research to reduce risk of error and other
uncertainties in the premises and calculations of the estimated risk. The foremost
example of such a risk is the possibly minuscule but potentially catastrophic
danger of igniting the Earth's atmosphere or oceans by atomic explosions.
62
Without considering the effect of uncertainty on experimental design and
subsequent projections, comparisons of risks on the basis of current research
cannot adequately determine future research policy.
2. Inequality of Risk Distribution
There are fundamental moral and philosophical problems with comparing
the severity of different harms to different groups of people. Risks are often
incommensurable, or comparable only by the suppression of crucial details or
related issues. Furthermore, evaluation of risks begs the question of "risk for
whom?" The same dangers pose different degrees of risk to different people,
or numbers of people, and have diffuse or concentrated effects. Which people
58. Nicholas A. Ashford, Risk Assessment and the Design of Policy for Worker Protection, 3 Am. J.
INDUS. MED. 241, 241-42 (1982); cf. Agency Procedures For Performing Regulatory Analysis of Rules, 1
C.F.R. § 305.85-2(7)(c) (1992) (recommending that agency rulemaking "must take into account.., the limits
of the methods and data used in the regulatory analysis").
59. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF S CC REVOLUrIONs 64-65, 90, 108-209 (1962)
(explaining how revolutionary science alters the "paradigms" that determine areas and methods of research
when existing paradigms are unable to account for accumulating theoretical and experimental anomalies).
But see KARL POPPER, QUANTUM THEORY AND THE SCHISM IN PHYsiCs 30-34 (1982) (considering evolution
of "specific theories" adequate to account for progressive increase in scientific understanding).
60. Telephone Interview with Aubrey Stoch, Research Fellow, Yale Medical School (Apr. 4, 1991).
61. For example, chlorofluorocarbons were invented in the 1930's, used so extensively in refrigeration
and aerosols that annual production reached 150,000 metric tons by 1960, and still exceeded 800,000 metric
tons by the time their danger to stratospheric ozone was first suspected in 1974. BENEDICK, supra note 22,
at 10-11 (1991).
62. The sparse scientific and historical literature, grave policy concerns, and mathematical aspects of
this issue are discussed in Fred Commoner, The Atmospheric Ignition Problem (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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should face which risks, and who should decide this issue, are questions of equity
and federalism.
In analyzing the equality (or equity) of risk distribution, it is important to
distinguish the aggregate risk (the total number of deaths or injuries) borne by
a population from the average risk borne by an individual. It is also important
to distinguish concentrated risks which threaten relatively predictable members
of society from diffusely distributed risks which threaten relatively unpredictable
groups. If aggregate risk were not a variable, the norm of distributional equality
would simply mean that all members of society should bear a similar average
risk, and that reducing the average risk of the majority slightly would not justify
increasing the average risk of the minority substantially. In reality, however,
aggregate risk is a variable: diffuse aggregate risks are often substantially higher
than those concentrated on fewer, though more predictable, victims. 63 Thus,
budgeting to equalize average risk directly conflicts with budgeting to minimize
aggregate risk.
Many advocates of comparative risk policy strongly criticize the belief that
average equity is preferable to a reduction in aggregate magnitude.64 These
critics focus on aggregate risk rather than on the average risk borne by members
of particular populations and stress that diffusing risk ex ante does not reduce
the gravity of actual harm ex post.65 Their counterargument, heard from the
Hill to Hartford, is that the Superfund program for cleaning hazardous waste
sites should be made a lower priority because, in the aggregate, comparatively
few people are at risk.66
Nevertheless, like aggregate magnitude, equity surely should constitute an
important, independent factor in the priority setting debate. The importance of
equity is compounded by the foreseeability of risks, particularly concentrated
risks; after all, risks are borne before actual harm occurs, at a time when they
can be anticipated. A decision to abandon those who live dangerously near
hazardous waste sites can be made more consciously than the decision to
abandon more people to less predictable, diffuse risks. Recognizing the effect
of prior knowledge on equity decisions, Guido Calabresi emphasizes how
democratic societies take great pains to avoid making sacrificial decisions for
63. One example of a diffuse aggregate risk is that posed by ozone completion. See, e.g., 137 CONG.
REC. 15,097-98 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (discussing one recent EPA estimate
that due to ozone depletion, "12 million Americans would develop skin cancer, and more than 200,000 of
them would die over the next 50 years").
64. Messer Interviews, supra note 14 (characterizing concern for equity as "equity fallacy"); cf. S. 2132,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(a)(4) (1991) (finding that "funds can only be used most effectively when they
protect the largest number of people from the most egregious harm"). But see STATIsTIcs: A GUIDE TO THE
UNKNOWN 84-85 (Judith M. Tanur et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989) (explaining "Simpson's Paradox" or "spurious
correlations" in which comparisons of aggregated data are misleading when important categories of data
are of different sizes).
65. Cf. Hornstein, supra note 5, at 595-98 (further distinguishing ex ante risk from ex post harm).
66. Warren Azano, Counsel, Aetna Insurance Company, Address as Visiting Speaker at Yale Law School
(Apr. 18, 1991) (saying that "new scientific studies place hazardous wastes way down on the list of risks").
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the good of the majority too deliberately. 67 Comparing facts and prioritizing
problems, when these facts and problems are of different scales, involve
judgments about equity. Statistical comparisons of aggregate risks can displace
methodological and political knowledge of and attention to the average risk
among smaller groups or individuals.68
3. Alternative Risk Reduction Methods and Allocations of Responsibilities
and Resources
Risk is not alone among issues deserving comparative analysis; decision-
makers must also compare alternative methods of risk reduction (and their
attendant costs) as well as different allocations of responsibilities and resources.
The costs involved in responding to risks vary considerably depending upon
the alternative reduction strategies selected. In fact, this variance often does not
correlate to the magnitude of the risks reduced. For example, OMB claims that
OSHA standards for underground construction sites save "38,000 lives for every
one million people exposed to the risk, at a cost of $100,000 per premature death
averted," while it estimates that "EPA's proposed standards for municipal solid
waste landfills would save less than one life for every million people exposed,
at a cost [of] $19.1 billion per death averted., 69 Risks should be compared,
but so must the costs and impacts of alternative attempts at risk reduction.70
Budgeting dominated by comparative risk analysis might also fail to make
explicit choices about allocations of responsibility and resources. Regardless
of relative risks, certain programs would be better executed by sharing and
shifting responsibility and resources among other agencies. As currently
proposed, risk based budgeting could all too easily proceed as if responsibility
for research were to be allocated to EPA's ORD alone.71 However, environ-
67. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrT, TRAGIC CHOICEs 76-78 (1978) (discussing society's manner
of avoiding sacrificial choices by blaming a scapegoat or inducing "pure lambs" to volunteer); GUIDO
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAW 1-7 (1985) (comparing and contrasting the
automobile with hypothetical "evil deity" who negotiates societal boons in return for human sacrifices).
68. As noted supra note 56, the SAB's Reducing Risk subcommittees pursued different approaches.
The Subcommittee on Ecology and Welfare ranked toxic substance risks to the global ecology lower than
atmospheric and habitational disturbances. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (summarizing rankings).
However, the Human Health Subcommittee placed similar toxic substances in their highest band of best
documented risks. If Reducing Risk, supra note 2, is read without attention to the subcommittees' differing
methods, and without consideration of questions of risk distribution, confusion of scales can arise. The
problems of hazardous waste are not addressed simply by making so-called larger problems a higher priority.
69. The Grim Math ofRating Risks, 23 NAT'L J. 1280 (1991); see MENDELOFF, supra note 55, at 22-23
(tabulating another range of safety costs).
70. See Agency Procedures for Performing Regulatory Analysis of Rules, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-2 (1992)
(advising use of regulatory impact analyses in agency rulemaking); H.R. 2404, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 14(d)(4) (proposing legislation for EPA to "identify[] and describ[e] technological barriers, and opportunities
for reducing or eliminating such barriers" to reduction of identified risks); Hornstein, supra note 5, at 616-29
(elaborating lack of consideration of alternatives in comparative risk analysis).
71. 'Cf. I C.F.R. § 305.85-2(7)(c) (1992) (recommending that agency rulemaking decisions "take into
account the limits of the agency's statutory authority and its overall policy goals").
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mental research priorities are, and should be, set not only among research grants
and programs, but also among offices,2 agencies, 3 and general budgetary
functions,74 in interaction with economic regulation75 and state or international
decisionmakers.76 Certain global risks should be shouldered in partnership with
other agencies or international bodies; certain local risks should be addressed
by states and municipalities. Lack of attention to the allocation of responsibility
may easily distort the implications of comparative risk analysis for ORD.
The need to consider alternative allocation of resources is particularly
pressing when program funds fall below a sufficient level of funding or critical
mass. Risk based budgeting might well increase the resources allocated to high
priorities but will not by itself ensure that low priorities receive critical mass.
Funding that falls below this level would clearly be better allocated to alternative
programs.
72. Of the EPA's $5.9 billion dollar budget, U.S. BUDGET FY 93, supra note 43, at 96 (1992), ORD
requests 8-9%, with $491 million requested for FY 1992, SAB FY 92 REVIEW, supra note 45, at3, reprinted
in EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1, at 85. The program suffered devastating cuts in 1982-83, from
which it has barely recovered in a decade, while research loads have doubled with increasing environmental
risks and legislation. The cuts also forced a drastic decline in the ratio of ORD's budget to the total EPA
budget. Id.
73. Interagency comparisons between environmental and health research departments in parallel agencies
show that EPA's ORD forms less than a third of the federal research budget for environment and natural
resources. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, NSF 90-311, FEDERAL R&D FUNDING BY BUDGET FUNCTION:
FISCAL YEARS 1989-91, at 85 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL R&D].
74. R&D has formed approximately 5% of the federal budget since the mid-1970's, with approximately
$68 billion proposed for 1991. Between 1989 and 1991, funding for R&D concerning natural resources and
the environment has formed approximately $1.3 billion, or 2% of total federal R&D. Environmental research
thus ranks sixth among the sixteen R&D budget functions in the National Science Foundation classification,
which range widely from approximately $41 billion proposed for defense R&D (61% of federal R&D) to
a mere $15 million dollars for general government research. As a ratio, research forms only 7.4 to 8% of
the total environmental budget, ranking sixth again on the wide spectrum of NSF categories, in which research
ranges from 0.1% of the general government budget and over 50% of the energy budget. Id. at 1-6. See
generally AMERICAN ASS'N ADVANCEMENT SCI., AAAS REPORT 17: R&D IN FY 1993 (1992); AMERICAN
ASS'N ADVANCEMENT SCI., CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON R&D IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1992 BUDGET (1992)
(detailing 10% increase in federal R&D for 1992).
75. EPA commands great leverage with its sweeping regulations, such as the requirements for
environmental impact statements, labelling, and disclosure of chemical output to public data banks under
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). Elliott, supra note 40,
(discussing EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-50 (1988)). Product liability, tax, patent, antitrust, and merger laws
further affect R&D incentives.
76. For example, the United States Global Change Research Program coordinates its activities with
organizations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions and the United Nations. COMMrITEE
ON EARTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, OUR CHANGING
PLANET: THE FY 1991 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 143-49 (1991) [hereinafter USGCRP
FY 91 ]. The global nature of the problems demands cooperation. When national legislation is comparatively
strict, the United States can also be spurred by competitive disadvantage to seek an international environmental
policy, encouraging research worldwide. Under pressures of competitive disadvantage, CFC industries in
the United States became instrumental in the nation's leadership in developing the Montreal Protocol. RICHARD
E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 69, 80 (1991).
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4. Potential Bureaucratic Problems
Risk based budgeting may pose bureaucratic problems if prioritization
schemes produce excessive formal analysis, excessive coordination, or excessive
costs deriving from rapid agenda changes. If formal analytical schemes for
priority setting are extended too far, risk based budgeting can illustrate
Parkinson's "Law of Triviality," which satirizes budget committees: "[T]he time
spent on any item of the agenda will be in inverse proportion to the sum
involved. 77 The focus on budgetary trivia is illustrated by one early "formal"
attempt at prioritizing within individual research programs, including an attempt
to set priorities among the criteria of prioritization themselves. The Subcommittee
on Natural Resources, Agriculture and Environment recently considered the
prioritization of research projects within the program of pollution prevention.
This portion of the research budget, amounting to a mere $11 million, was
apparently allocated according to a system of eight factors: "Overall environ-
mental impacts, potential cost effectiveness of proposed activities, degree of
need for information, importance of EPA's contribution in the area, ability to
achieve near-term results, and so on."78 Further inquiry focused on the ranking
of these factors themselves. The ORD witness described the highest priority
criterion rather generally as "the impact upon human health and the environ-
ment." Other factors were themselves ranked qualitatively and applied to each
pollution prevention project.79 A decisionmaker in this maze of abstract
formality would only be led in circles, however, because general goals-such
as effectiveness, importance, and informativeness-have been confused with
the criteria for judging their achievement80
If extended too far, risk based schemes can also result in excessive coordi-
nation. Coordinating arrangements may be suspect as potential "gimmicks" that
repackage and market existing programs to attract or simulate new funding.
Coordination may also interfere with the research efforts of scientists by
increasing the number of meetings they must attend. 2
77. C. NoRmTcom PARKINSON, PARKINSON'S LAW 63 (1957).
78. EPA R&D FY 91 Hearing, supra note 14, at 29 (questions of Howard Wolpe, D-Michigan,
Subcommittee member, response of Erich Bretthauer, Assistant Administrator, ORD).
79. Id.
80. One cannot evaluate the relative need for certain research information on the basis of the "need
for information." Id. Nor can one evaluate the importance of EPA's contribution on the basis of the "impor-
tance of EPA's contribution." Id. "Near-term results," id., are in no way self evidently more valuable than
long term research-if anything, long term vision distinguishes the ORD from other, strictly regulatory offices.
Evaluating the relative "impact upon human health and the environment," id., only begs the question of
how different kinds of impacts should be compared.
81. Telephone Interview with Robert W. Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager, Office
of Technology Assessment (May 14, 1991) [hereinafter Niblock Interview] (expressing skepticism about
certain scientific and institutional proposals for reforming prioritization).
82. Cf. Telephone Interview with Hassan Virji, Assistant to Director of Geoscience, National Science
Foundation (May 13, 1991) (acknowledging that such meetings have certainly multiplied, but arguing that
program was both young and unique, and that evaluation would have to wait); infra notes 119-128 and
accompanying text (discussing USGCRP).
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The costs of changing agendas must also be taken into account in imple-
menting risk based budgeting. According to Kenneth Arrow, the cost of
processing information discourages organizations from changing their agendas.
Increasing the scale of the agenda requires further specialization, which produces
ever-increasing complexity and higher communication costs. By changing
agendas, the agency also wastes its existing codes of communication and other
capital investments already made for sharing specialized information.83 Further-
more, the demand for new items may be limited by their uncertain value.'
Government bureaus sometimes develop precisely this risk aversion when
responding to the demands of a critical electorate: they budget conservatively
and prefer projects with certain and measurable outcomes.
85
Changing budgetary agendas to reflect scientific findings also poses
accounting problems, since changing the budgetary agenda impedes comparison
of the budgets of different fiscal years. Although the well-established classifi-
cation of environmental legislation and budgeting does not accommodate
scientific changes, members of Congress and their staffs often prefer to see a
similar classification from fiscal year to fiscal year so as to compare changes. 86
Although risk based budgeting is a promising idea, budget decisionmakers
should also consider other policies. Analysis of bureaucratic issues-like analysis
of responsibility and resource allocation, risk reduction, risk distribution, and
uncertainty-should complement comparative risk analysis in reforming EPA
research priorities.87 The next Part offers suggestions for expanding risk based
budgeting.
83. KENNErH J. ARROw, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 59 (1974). Conversely, when pursuing their
existing agendas, organizations use information more efficiently than individuals. Organizations are well
structured to monitor alternative items for agendas, especially when these are strongly demanded by a crisis,
or easily supplied by fortuitous research overlaps and staff turnover. See id. at 52-53, 59.
84. Id. at41.
85. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11258 (1989); cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 69-70,
191 (1989) (describing similar bureaucratic risk aversion). Capital communication costs and uncertainty lead
Arrow to mention a "tendency to hive off incompatible functions into new organizations." ARROW, supra
note 83, at 58. He mentions the tendency descriptively, in passing, after describing normative suggestions
of other theorists that military R&D should be placed under civilian control and that scientific management
should be separated from budgetary control. (The vision of this "need" for the separation of new agendas
into new agencies is ascribed to Franklin D. Roosevelt.) Id. at 57-58. After Arrow's diagnosis, however,
we may well ask whether the treatment he prescribes en passant is an adequate alternative.
86. Veirce Interview, supra note 16 (describing problems as ORD program analyst "wearing two hats"
of scientific training and financial experience). For example, some Agency staff, disgruntled with President
Carter's "zero-based budgeting." refer to the added responsibility as accounting "down to the last peanut."
Id.; see supra note 39 (explaining "zero-based budgeting").
87. Cf. Blomquist, supra note 5, at 179-88 (discussing relationship between risk and other general
environmental policy issues).
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLIcY AUGMENTATION OF
RISK BASED BUDGETING LEGISLATION
Environmental research budgeting reforms should accommodate institutional
and policy factors, to develop more fully the systematic and comprehensive
potential of risk based comparisons and to specify the diverse range of criteria
and values on which reasoned prioritization depends.
A. Bilateral Delegation to Congressional Experts
In order to prevent the increase of executive influence over scientific matters,
authority for risk based priority setting should not be delegated solely to
specialists in the Executive. Instead, Congress should delegate "bilaterally" to
specialists in both Congress and the Executive. Bilateral delegation would shift
power in the Executive away from OMB to EPA and its ORD and SAB, and
in Congress, away from the appropriations committees to the environmental
science committees, with possible contributions from the congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA).
Such bilateral delegation would increase participation and decrease potential
domination by either branch in policy debates. Congress should enhance the
budgetary role of congressional science committees and executive science offices,
not as a way to create adversarial relationships between branches of government,
but to minimize the opportunities for manipulative advantage and to equalize
incentives to reach a consensus on scientific matters.88 Shared involvement
by the Congress and the Executive would also synergistically combine their
respective expertise in political and administrative matters.
Bilateral delegation would also increase the representation of constituencies
of different scales. Direct congressional representation may be desirable when
decisions require representation of state or congressional district interests.
Presidential accountability and a national mandate may be preferable to
coordinate assessment and comparison of aggregate risks on a national scale,
and to challenge or veto congressional priorities otherwise uninformed by
scientific expertise or coordinated oversight. 89 Bilateral delegation, and hence
equally informed bilateral representation, would be particularly valuable in
decisions about the distribution of risk, which involve judgments about research
of widely varying scales.
88. See JASANOFF, supra note 6, at 250 (1990) (concluding that negotiation about scientific issues
commits parties to moderate their views in regulatory context); see also supra note 569 (noting politicization
of advisory committees). Of course, bilateral delegation invites the political capture of specialist agencies
and committees because this policy increases the stakes of the scientific debates in which they engage. But
shifting from budgetary politics to science does situate the debate on a more relevant battlefield.
89. See Mashaw, Prodelegadon, supra note 41, at 95-96, 98 (describing President's national mandate;
arguing for delegation to account for "situational variance").
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Two ways for decisionmakers to attempt to increase scientific influence over
EPA research priority setting are suggested here. First, the House Committee
on Science, Space and Technology and the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works should attempt to determine environmental research priorities
themselves, drawing on and deferring to the expertise of their specialized
environmental subcommittees and scientific staff.90 The House Subcommittee
on Environment and the Senate Subcommittee on Toxic Substances, Envi-
ronmental Oversight, and Research and Development could seek to mandate
priorities by making scientific findings and drafting substantive legislation that
might survive the revisions and line-items of appropriations legislation.91
Legislation could be designed to specify budgetary priorities in the form of
proportions or ratios of the budget which would persist regardless of the actual
amounts of budgetary appropriations, along the lines of the recent mandate for
the expenditure of at least 15% of certain appropriations for continuing and long
term environmental research and development.
92
The recommendation to legislate budgetary priorities per se finds some
support in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,93
the doctrine of "disfavoring repeals by implication" was invoked to prevent
statutory priorities from being repealed incidentally in the course of other
legislation, including budgeting legislation. The Court held the scope of
appropriations bills to be limited by express rules of both Houses to the effect
that appropriations measures may not change existing substantive law.
94
Although the appropriations committees had continuously allocated funds for
the almost completed TVA dam, the substantive "priority" set by the Endangered
Species Act of 197395 protected the snail darter fish and prevented completion
90. Cf. Roger H. Davidson, Subcommittee Government. New Channels ForPolicy Making, in THE NEW
CONGRESS 118-24 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds., 1981) (discussing "jurisdictional" politics);
C. Lawrence Evans, Influence in Congressional Committees: Participation, Manipulation, andAnticipation,
in CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS 155 (Christopher J. Deering ed., 1989); David P. Hamilton, Brown Picks Old
Faces For a New Team, 251 SCIENCE 377 (199 1) (describing appointments of expert scientific staff by chair
of House Committee of Science, Space, and Technology). Compare Davidson, supra, at 99, 106-08, 115-18
(describing increasing tendency toward subcommittee government, especially within House Democratic Party
in 1970's and early 1980's) and Richard L. Hall, Committee Decision Making in the Postreform Congress,
in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 197-220 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989) (de-
scribing decentralized process) with Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Consolidating Power in
the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra, at 39-61 (describing and
assessing development of centralized majority party leadership and elite committees).
91. See, e.g., Letter from George E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, to Science, in 252 SCIENCE 629 (1991) [hereinafter Brown Letter] (announcing intention of
his House Committee to set priorities for federal R&D comprehensively and systematically).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4363 (West Supp. 1992).
93. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
94. 437 U.S. at 189-91; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REv. 405, 456-57 & nn.183-84 (1989) (discussing interpretation of appropriations measures that
alter substantive statutes).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4(1), 93 Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988)).
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of the dam.96 The case demonstrates that environmental priorities can be set
independently of appropriations committees.
Second, risk based budgeting should involve new roles for scientific agencies
in both the Executive and Congress, namely, the executive Office of Research
and Development (ORD), the Science Advisory Board (SAB) in the EPA, and
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
The SAB currently reviews ORD priorities, but with ambiguous authority.
At recent hearings of the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture
Research and Environment, ORD announced that it was "moving toward a new
planning process that w[ould] define EPA's research program around a set of
risk based issues."'" The SAB summarily "applaud[ed] ORD's continuing
efforts" 98 and officially described themselves as "pleased," 99 while privately
some SAB officials wondered when the results of their Reducing Risk study
would be fully incorporated in the President's budget. SAB officials usually
defend ORD's requests for funds from Congress, even as they attempt to monitor
and reform ORD's allocation of those funds. Some recommend that Congress
mandate and fund an SAB comparative risk study every two years.'1
Congress should commission contributions to the debate by its own experts
in the OTA to avoid dependence on executive agencies and to augment the policy
debate. OTA is a relatively small, analytic agency for Congress that has notable
experience in evaluating individual environmental programs-such as the
Department of Defense's nuclear waste disposal projects°1 --and federal
research policy, for which they have drawn rare praise. ta
OTA researchers have never been directly asked to compare the relative
merits of different programs. Moreover, they expect little interest from congres-
sional committees in such comparative questions, which tend to cross the lines
of individual committees' jurisdictional areas of interest. 03 The approach of
OTA scientists if Congress did pose the comparative question to them would
probably be to address directly the policy issues inherent in risk based budgeting,
treating quantitative comparative risk assessment as but one of many useful
analytical methods. Finally, OTA would likely proceed by assembling a variety
of experts and synthesizing outside concerns from their own perspective, along
96. 437 U.S. at 194.
97. EPA R&D FY92 Hearing, supra note I (statement of Erich W. Bretthauer, Assistant Administrator,
EPA Office of Research and Development).
98. John Neuhold, Cover Letter to SAB FY 92 REVIEW, supra note 45, reprinted in EPA R&D FY
92 Hearing, supra note 1, at 76.
99. SAB FY 92 REVIEw, supra note 45, at 4, reprinted in EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1,
at 86.
100. Rondberg Interview, supra note 8.
101. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-O-484, COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (1991) [hereinafter COMPLEX CLEANUP].
102. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, OTA-SET-490, FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARcH: DECISION
FOR A DECADE (1991); Brown Letter, supra note 91 (describing OTA-SET-490 as "probably the most
comprehensive and balanced analysis of federal R&D policy produced to date").
103. Niblock Interview, supra note 81.
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the lines of the OTA review of National Energy Strategy in the late 1970's in
which it summoned 30 to 40 panels of affected parties, technical experts,
academics, and leaders of public opinion. 1°4 Such participation would add
diverse and important perspectives to the risk based budgeting process. 5
In delegating to scientific committees, legislators might simultaneously
reconsider constraints on the delegation of judgments to scientific advisory
boards performing studies or coordinating roles in both branches.0 6 Short of
cumbersome legislation requiring a specificity reviewable in court, statutes might
require SAB and OTA to identify methodological and policy assumptions
explicitly in final reports. 07
B. Addressing Policy Issues
Reform proposals should also address the policy issues that inform and
complement budgeting on the basis of risk, including uncertainty, equity, risk-
reduction, responsibility, resources, and bureaucracy.
1. Monitoring For Scientific Uncertainty
In the face of uncertainty, a variety of exploratory approaches should be
adopted in order to monitor potential risks, including those of error and
ignorance. Alternative ways to translate comparative analysis into budgetary
terms include reflecting relative risks (1) as varying proportions of funding, or
(2) as a time-ordered series of projects on a calendar. The serial approach allows
policy makers to devote more resources at a given time to certain priorities, but
may postpone others indefinitely. The proportional approach allows both a wider
initial choice of priorities and monitoring of alternative potential priorities, but
104. Id.
105. OTA's general skepticism about the value of risk assessment research is revealed by the many
warnings enunciated in its recent report on the proposed cleanup of defense nuclear waste. The costs have
been projected to reach $155 billion, including an initial five years of research and development. COMPLEX
CLEANUP, supra note 101, at 60-64 (1991) (criticizing Department of Energy "risk based" budget priority
system); id. at 55-59 (discussing estimates while further noting likelihood of underestimation by 25% -100%
in environmental restoration projects). This research, according to OTA, would generate "mounds of paper
studies without so much as a spade-full of action," and still leave regulators "without necessarily knowing
what to dig, and still needing to know before digging." Niblock Interview, supra note 81.
106. Legislation already governs the formation and governance of scientific advisory boards. Federal
Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988); Government in the Sunshine Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988); see also Nicholas A. Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use
in RegulatoryDecisionmaking, in 9 ScI., TEcH. & Hum. VALUES 72, 73, 76-79 & nn. I & 16 (1984) (discuss-
ing expert and democratic roles-and abuse-of advisory committees; analyzing FACA requirements for
"fair balance" in legislative history as balances of competence, technical discipline, and allegiance, in contrast
with political replacement of almost 60 SAB members in 1983). See generally JASANOFF, supra note 6, at
32-36 (discussing "congressional ambivalence" about scientific advice given at EPA by Science Advisory
Board, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, and Science Advisory Panel).
107. Scientific committees and their leadership may vary in their own conception of the role and
reliability of science. While such different approaches may be detailed in committee studies, they may not
be as apparent in the summary form of final reports, see supra note 56.
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may spread resources too thinly. Given the scale and uncertainty of environ-
mental research, it is imperative to strike a careful balance between serial and
proportional prioritization, so as to ensure not only ordered responses to known
risks, but also discovery of those remaining unknown.'05 The risk of failing
to discover environmental risks should also be diversified: while priorities must
be set, alternative lines of research should be sufficiently monitored.'0 9
2. Considering the Equality of Risk Distribution
The equality of risk distribution should be carefully considered as priorities
are set. Attention to the issue of equality is especially important in the research
context, because the very distinctions between predictable and unpredictable
as well as between concentrated and diffuse risks are difficult to define and thus
raise complex questions of epidemiology. Risks from genetic predisposition may
be more difficult to predict than those from geographical or industrial exposure
to hazardous substances but are no less deserving of funds. Indeed, such diffuse
groups are arguably in special need of protection."0 Furthermore, the greater
the predictability and concentration of a given risk, the greater the likelihood
of countervailing benefit from such a risk, and the greater the degree of choice
or knowledge that may be available--or should be made available-to the group
at risk."'
The unresolved and competing considerations of policy and justice that are
relevant to comparisons of aggregate and average risks borne by population
groups of different sensitivities and scales should be discussed in a forum
allowing diverse representation or participation. Bilateral delegation would allow
the President and Congress to represent national and regional interests,
respectively, thus increasing the equity of federal environmental research
budgeting.
108. For example, the Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that agencies
experiment with a "phase system" of reducing options. Initially, the agency should "identify as large a number
of options as it can for brief study. As options are considered and rejected, the remaining options should
be analyzed with increasing thoroughness. As resource constraints preclude further consideration... the
agency should explain briefly.., why the option did not warrant further study." 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-2(l)(b)
(1992).
109. Cf. generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 221-28 (5th ed. 1990)
(simplifying portfolio theory of investment, citing HARRY MARKOWrrZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION; EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959)).
110. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,742 (1985) (arguing
that rights of diffuse, anonymous majorities are underrepresented in politics and require extension of the
constitutional protection historically necessary for discrete and insular minorities).
111. Occupational hazards are a typical example of concentrated risks of which the benefits, choice,
and even knowledge, are not, in fact, always fully available to the particular group exposed. Cf. Hornstein,
supra note 5, at 597-98; CALABRESI & BOBB1n, supra note 67, at 24-26 (1978) (regarding equality as culturally




3. Comparing Alternative Risk Reduction Methods and Reallocating
Responsibility and Resources
Risk based budgeting should also be augmented by comparisons of alterna-
tive risk reduction methods and reallocations of responsibility and resources.
For instance, while ozone research funds might ultimately reduce aggregate risks
to more people than those devoted to cleaning certain hazardous waste sites,
there is no logical necessity to ignore toxic waste programs. Less expensive
alternatives to cleaning may be available, including containment of leakage, assis-
tance in relocation, or at the very least testing and warnings. There is also no
need to sacrifice EPA research on toxic waste for the sake of research on ozone
protection if global issues might be better pursued by economic regulation or
with a shared, interagency or international budget. Comparison of alternative
risk reduction methods is necessary for a proper comparison of research
programs.
At times, agency priorities should not shift, but resources should be increased
or responsibilities reallocated. New tasks often require new funds.1 2 Line items
should be limited in size or proportion, if they cannot be. banned outright at
certain stages of the budgetary process. Certainly "when funds are earmarked
for special programs additional monies [should] be appropriated to accommodate
them. 113 Revenues may be raised and disbursed and responsibilities reallocated
even without budgetary authorization, such as by research and development tax
credits and requirements for matching funds.114 Resources and responsibilities
may need to be diverted from other areas. For example, discretion and flexibility
for researchers in the administration would be enhanced by freeing them from
some of their responsibilities to regulators through independent research titles,
by improving the ratio between funds earmarked for basic and applied re-
search,115 or by increasing the ORD/EPA budgetary ratio. 116 Meanwhile,
112. While this problem is faced by all new, initially "soft" legislation, funds often follow programs.
See WILDAVSKY, supra note 39, at 115 (quoting Representative Rooney's description of $250 item as "the
camel's nose," which reveals itself to be large animal after entering the tent (i.e., the budget)).
113. SAB FY 92 REVIEW, supra note 45, at 6, reprinted in EPA R&D FY 92 Hearing, supra note 1,
at 88.
114. General R&D tax credits, or perhaps tax credits specifically accompanying grants, could serve
as a similar substitute in the case of private corporations receiving grants. See LEDERMAN, supra note 45,
at 19 (recommending "trust fund supported by special taxes on high technology" and "government bonds,
designated for research, with interest keyed to the returns on that research"); see also supra notes 72-71
and accompanying text. Matching fund requirements may bind private money to governmental spending
conditions, although the amount of such privately affected funds may be limited in some ways. Compare,
e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a) (1991) (prohibiting abortion counseling by clinics receiving Title X family planning
grants) with 42 U.S.C. §300a-4 (1988) (requiring of HHS that "no [Title X] grant... after June 30, 1975
... be made for less than 90 per centum of its costs").
115. Cf., e.g., supra note 92 and accompanying text.
116. Cf., e.g., FEDERAL R&D, supra note 73, at 1-6 (revealing increase in proposed ratio between energy
research and total energy budget, from 52% in 1990 to 85% in 1991, despite 5% net cut of energy R&D
funds in absolute terms).
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to police procurement and grant misuse, funds for auditing, penalties, or (for
this limited purpose) judicial review should be increased.'"
7
An important example of coordinating responsibilities and resources for
environmental research prioritization can be found in the interagency United
States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP).118 Since the early 1980's,
USGCRP has coordinated research on the earth sciences across five departments
and four agencies." 9 Control is centralized in the Executive,'2 albeit with
some conflict,' 2 1 and is unencumbered by direct legislation and congressional
control." Since 1990, an interdisciplinary priority framework has structured
a five year research plan for USGCRP 23 A recent USGCRP budgetary report
elaborates a theme of agency "cooperation," in an "integrated, comprehensive"
and "interdisciplinary" program, as environmental research projects proceed
"simultaneously and in concert ... [as] mutually reinforcing,"' 24 with a "bal-
ance between ground- and space-based research activities."2 5 EPA shares of
this research budget suggest that coordination may well result in vastly different
degrees of responsibility among the agencies involved. In 1990, the annual
budget coordinated by USGCRP rocketed more than five-fold to include NASA's
Earth Observing System and Satellites, now launched as "Mission to Planet
117. Agency auditing is rather constrained. Veirce Interview, supra note 16 (explaining dependency
on grantees for "colorable estimates" of actual expenditures and research directions; estimating that potential
problems of abuse were outweighed by cost of the 20% increase in personnel that would be required for
a significant increase in oversight); see also Eliot Marshal, Tiger Teams Draw Researchers' Snarls, 252
SCIENCE 366, 366-68 (describing Department of Energy inspection forces and questioning whether costs
of compliance outweigh risks reduced).
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931-37 (Supp. HI 1990).
119. These are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce (National Office of Air Administration),
Defense, Energy, and Interior (U.S. Geological Survey); the agencies are EPA, NASA, the National Science
Foundation, and the Smithsonian. USGCRP is but one of about 13 working groups under the Committee
on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), which is centered at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
in the Department of Interior. CEES is one of seven committees under the Federal Coordinating Council
for Science and Engineering Technology (FCCSET, pronounced "Fixit"), which is administered from the
executive Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
120. For example, in 1991, Dr. D. Allen Bromley, the chairman of FCCSET, was also Director of OSTP
(following 42 U.S.C. § 665 1(c) (1988)) and Science Advisor to the President. The chairman of CEES, Dr.
Dalles Pack, was also Director of USGS.
121. See, e.g., David P. Hamilton, FCCSET Under Fire, 252 SCIENCE 1365 (1991) (describing Interior
Secretary Lujan's resistance to early requests for budget data by FCCSET); The High and Mighty, 255
SCIENCE 19 (1992) (rumoring possible departure of Science Advisor Bromley from future administration
due to conflict with OMB).
122. Telephone Interview with Tom Watts, Office of Management and Budget (May 14, 1991). FCCSET
was originally established under 42 U.S.C. § 6651 (1988), but has been abolished and its functions
(presumably including CEES and USGCRP under42 U.S.C. §§ 2932(a), 2934(a) (1988)) have been transferred
to the President since Reorg. Plan No. I of 1977, 3 C.FR. at 197, 198 § 5A (1977), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. (1988), as provided in Exec. Order No. 12,039, 3 C.F.R. at 139 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1988). See also Charter, Committee on Earth Sciences, reprinted in COMMITrEE ON EARTH AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL SCIENCES, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE FY
1990 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 29 [hereinafter USGCRP FY 90].
123. USGCRP FY 91, supra note 76, at 13 (depicting priority framework in elaborate diagram).
124. COMM=ITEE ON EARTH AND ENvIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE FY 1992 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 5 [hereinafter
USGCRP FY 92].
125. Id. at 8.
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Earth," with a new focus on global change. 26 The President's 1992 request
for the nine recipients of USGCRP funding was approximately $1.2 billion, with
almost two thirds of this sum earmarked for space based research by NASA,
and only $26 million requested for EPA's ORD. 27 The NASA lion's share
of $772.6 million is about fifteen times larger than the average of $51.6 million
for each of the other eight agencies involved. The Earth Observation System
(EOS) may provide NASA with a new environmental purpose and alleviate the
responsibilities of offices such as ORD, even though, so far, planning for the
program has not inspired the confidence of congressional analysts.S
Critical masses, the minimum budgetary requirements of any particular
program, are, like priorities themselves, a substantive consideration, affecting
the very efficacy or superfluity of a program. Rather than allowing priorities
to be excessively determined by appropriation levels and line items, legislation
should specify ratios and minimum, critical masses. If lower priorities are not
deemed worthy of maintaining critical mass at the expense of needed increases
in higher priority areas, contingent legislation could revise allocation priorities,
delete the small program entirely, and redistribute funds across remaining
priorities if critical mass is lost.129 Budget categories should thus be classified
as interdependent, so that proposed increases for high priority areas are not
obtained at the expense of the critical mass needed by programs with a lower
profile and so that programs funded below critical mass do not drain
resources.13
0
4. Moderation in Agenda Reform
Agenda reform toward and beyond risk based budgeting should proceed
at a moderate pace to mitigate potential bureaucratic problems. Changes in
agenda directly affect the working lives of agency staff by adding new responsi-
bilities, for which the Agency may be answerable in Congress or court, and by
displacing traditional centers of legislative and agency power. The costs of
126. Compare USGCRP FY 91, supra note 76, at 160 with USGCRP FY 90, supra note 122, at 24-25
(revealing dramatic, unprecedented increase in NASA share of USGCRP with advent of Earth Observing
System).
127. USGCRP FY 92, supra note 124, at 19.
128. See Eliot MarshaU, Accountants Fret Over ECS Data, 255 S cIENCE 1206(1992) (reporting criticisms
of EOS planning in recent GAO report and house hearing), citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMTEC-92-
24, EARTH OBSERVING SYsTEM : NASA's EOS DIS DEVELOPMENT APPROACH IS RISKY (1992).
129. The EPA Administrator's standard reprogramming authority, see supra note 14, may be too limited
for this purpose, see Roberts, supra note 2, at 618 (reporting estimate that Administrator effectively retains
discretion over only 5% of EPA budget).
130. Cf. supra text accompanying note 91 (proposing substantive priority setting by congressional
committees). Contrast the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,2 U.S.C.A. § 900(4)(A) (Supp. 1992), which,
conversely, classifies budgetary categories of domestic, defense, and foreign assistance independently for
reconciliation purposes, such that certain reductions in one category cannot be used to increase the allotment
in another. For example, cuts in foreign assistance cannot fund domestic education. See Colin Norman, Science
Increases Will Test New Regime, 251 SCIENCE 617 (1991) (noting implications of Budget Enforcement Act
for R&D funding).
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changing everyday accounting methods and styles of oversight can be felt in
very job-specific ways. "You'd have people going crazy or leaving; you need
a certain protectionism in the buffeting of political winds." One "boss from the
outside," encountering the civil service from a fresh, managerial perspective,
reportedly described the difficulties of making necessary changes: "[I]t's like
flying a B-29 in a dogfight-sure takes a long time to turn. [Success] depends
on how fast you turn the comers.' 31 While changes are needed, ORD staff
hope that it is neither too radical, nor subsequently too fixed. One proposal made
in preliminary discussions contemplated forty to fifty alternative budgetary
categories so that the budget would better reflect risk categories. Staff who would
have to reorganize program budgeting and monitoring to reflect these changes
would prefer a tenth of the shift: four to five new areas a year.
132
The prospects for the adoption of risk based budgeting may depend on the
form such legislation takes. Risk based budgeting for research has more chance
of success as an amendment but more to gain as a freestanding bill. For example,
new research titles have been created as amendments to individual environmental
acts. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, while necessitating additional
regulatory research, incorporate a significant new research title for "[r]esearch,
investigation, training, and other activities.' '133 This title includes authorization
for research in environmental health, ecosystems, and a renewal of the NAPAP
interagency acid rain program, as well as research in methodology and pollution
prevention. However, insofar as agenda shifts toward basic, exploratory, and
preventative research are desired, they will be more responsive to agency
supported scientists if they have their own research title. A more ambitious
strategy than the amendment of existing legislation would be to pass a new,
freestanding environmental research bill such as ERDDA of 1978 (which gave
the Science Advisory Board its mandate),' Congressman Ritter's more recent
CERMA bill, 35 or Senator Moynihan's Environmental Risk Reduction Act.36
Proposals for new interagency boards or programs tend to fail, however, when
they attempt (or threaten) to do too much. For example, the defeated bill
proposing a Risk Assessment Research and Demonstration Act of 1983 was
unanimously opposed by five affected departments and agencies.
137
131. Veirce Interview, supra note 16.
132. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (West Supp. 1984-1990).
134. Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978,42 U.S.C.
§ 4365 (1988).
135. H.R. 5435, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (proposing Comprehensive Environmental Risk
Management Act).
136. S. 2132, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). For further discussion of this bill, see text accompanying
notes 35-36.
137. H.R. 4192, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). Opposing submissions by EPA, OSHA, CPSC, FDA,
and FSIS are appended to H.R. 4192, The Risk AssessmentResearch and Demonstration Act ofl983: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment of the Comm. on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 289, 402, 430, 444 (1984).
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Agendas should be changed in Congress and the Executive, but gradually,
without excessive subclassification, coordination, or bureaucratic costs. While
the agency has begun using "buzzwords" such as "risk based budgeting," reform
will probably take some time. 3'
CONCLUSION
Quantitative comparisons promise a systematic, comprehensive specificity
that should indeed inform environmental research priority setting. Though science
informs policy choices, however, it cannot make them. Because comparative
risk analysis provides a necessary but insufficient basis for reforming EPA re-
search priorities, the current proposals for risk based budgeting approach should
be augmented and refined. Offices within both Congress and the Executive
should participate in the setting of priorities, and in so doing, these policymakers
should pay close attention to fundamental methodological questions and values.
These reforms, by facilitating greater participation in scientific debates as well
as a greater diversity of policy languages, should increase the overall resistance
of science to political capture and thus enhance the value of risk analysis in
planning EPA's research.'3 9
138. Niblock Interview, supra note 81.
139. Cf. generally GEORGE STEINER, AFrER BABEL: ASPECmS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATIONpassim
(1975) (appreciating languages for their diversity rather than for their possible universal structure); Genesis
11:7-9 (narrating how unitary language enabled construction of a "tower with its head in the heavens" until
language was diversified by God for potential abuse of power at Babel).
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